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Abstract 
We provide new evidence on the effectiveness of West German labour market programmes 
by evaluating training and employment programmes that have been conducted 2000 - 2002 
after the first large reform of German labour market policy in 1998. We employ excep-
tionally rich administrative data that allow us to use microeconometric matching methods 
and to estimate interesting effects for different types of programmes and participants at a 
rather disaggregated level. We find that, on average, all programmes fail to improve their 
participants' chances of finding regular, unsubsidised employment. Rather, participants 
accumulate 2 - 13 more months of unemployment than nonparticipants over the 2.5 years 
following programme start, which, in addition to direct programme costs, induces net costs 
in terms of benefit payments and wage subsidies amounting to, on average, 1500- 7000 EUR 
per participant. However, we show that there is some scope for improvements in mean 
employment rates as well as potential for considerable cost savings by a reallocation of 
participants to the different programmes. 
Keywords 
Matching estimation, causal effects, programme evaluation, panel data 
JEL Classification 
J68 1 Introduction
In recent years, large advancements have been made in understanding the e®ects of active labour
market policies (ALMPs). The early literature, which was mainly concerned with labour market
training and focused on short to medium-run e®ects (see the surveys by Fay, 1996; Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002), was rather pes-
simistic about the e®ectiveness of such programmes as most vividly illustrated by a quote from
Jim Heckman, who said in the Economist: \Zero is not a bad number." (April 6, 1996, p.23).
In contrast, the ¯rst studies that were able to estimate long-term e®ects of ALMPs suggested
that some wage subsidies and training programmes actually seem to increase the employability
and earnings of their participants in the long run (e.g. Couch, 1992; Hotz, Imbens, and Kler-
man, 2000; Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, 2004; Jespersen, Munch, and
Skipper, 2004; Fitzenberger and Speckesser, 2005; Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and VÄ olter, 2007).
Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that, in the presence of treatment e®ect heterogeneity,
the optimality of the assignment process of jobseekers to programmes also becomes crucial for
the overall e®ectiveness of the programmes (see e.g. FrÄ olich, Lechner, and Steiger, 2003; Lechner
and Smith, 2005; Lechner and Wunsch, 2006a; FrÄ olich, 2007).
Recently, Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006) provided a potential explanation for the diversity
of the estimates of the e®ects of training. Being able to observe outcomes over 8 years after
programme start they show that all programmes they consider exhibit negative employment and
earnings e®ects in the short run, which are directly related to programme duration (so-called
lock-in e®ects in the terminology of van Ours, 2004).1 In the medium to long-run, however,
most programmes show sustainable positive e®ects. There are two general conclusions from their
study. First, the longer the programmes and the shorter the available time horizon for observing
outcomes, the less likely it is to detect potential positive e®ects of the programmes. Second,
1 Negative lock-in e®ects are a common ¯nding in the microeconometric evaluation literature, see e.g. Ger¯n and
Lechner (2002); van Ours (2004); Sianesi (2004, 2007); Jespersen, Munch, and Skipper (2004).
1programme durations are the key determinant of the size of the lock-in e®ects and the speed of
recovery of employment rates and earnings.
In this paper, we provide new insights on the di®erential e®ects of ALMPs. We employ ex-
ceptionally rich administrative data that allows us to use microeconometric matching methods
and to estimate interesting e®ects for di®erent types of programmes and participants at a rather
disaggregated level. We evaluate 7 types of training, which di®er considerably in the extent of
the human capital investment, as well as subsidised non-market jobs (so-called employment pro-
grammes) that have been conducted in West Germany 2000-2002 after the ¯rst large reform of
German ALMP in 1998.
We ¯nd that, after the typical lock-in e®ects, all programmes fail to improve their partici-
pants' chances of ¯nding regular, unsubsidised employment within 2.5 years after programme
start. Rather, participants accumulate 2-13 more months of unemployment than nonparticipants
over this period, partly because of additional programme participation. In addition to direct
programme costs, this induces net costs in terms of bene¯t payments and wage subsidies of, on
average, 1500-7000 EUR per participant. Moreover, there is no evidence that positive employment
e®ects can be expected for later periods lying outside our observation window.
These ¯ndings are in contrast to Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005), Lechner, Miquel, and
Wunsch (2006), Lechner and Wunsch (2006b) and Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and VÄ olter (2007),
who provide a rather positive assessment of the e®ectiveness of di®erent types of West German
training programmes conducted before 1998,2 but are in line with the evidence of Caliendo, Hujer,
and Thomsen (2004a,b, 2005a,b), Hujer and Thomsen (2006) on recent employment programmes.
However, comparing our results to the previous ¯ndings of Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006)
for training conducted 1993-1994, which are based on similar data and a similar methodology,
we can rule out that di®erences in the aggregation of programme types or the de¯nition of the
2 These studies use administrative data that has been compiled speci¯cally for the evaluation of labour market
training. One drawback of these data is, however, that it is not possible to distinguish subsidised from non-
subsidised employment when measuring outcome variables.
2outcome variables or the unavailability of some control variables are responsible for their more
positive results. Hence, either the quality of the programmes, the participants or the assignment
process, or certain characteristics of the labour market, which make programme participation less
rewarding, seem to have changed since the early 1990s.
Our results are also in contrast to Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Waller (2006), who
assess the e®ectiveness of three broad types of training programmes conducted 2000-2001 in West
Germany applying matching methods to subsamples of participants strati¯ed by unemployment
duration. They ¯nd positive e®ects for women with longer unemployment durations and in some
cases also for men. Their results are not directly comparable, though. Because they de¯ne
participants and nonparticipants as those persons who either do or do not start a programme at
a speci¯c point in time in the unemployment spell, their ¯nding of positive programme e®ects
might merely be due to a fraction of the so de¯ned nonparticipants starting a programme when
the actual participants just completed theirs. Moreover, some of their estimates are based on
rather small samples.3
We detect considerable e®ect heterogeneity, though. Jobseekers with relatively good a-priori
employment prospects fare particularly badly because of prohibitively large lock-in e®ects from
which they recover only very slowly. Correspondingly, jobseekers with disadvantageous a-priori
employment prospects show below average lock-in e®ects. For this group we even ¯nd positive
employment e®ects of some of the shorter training programmes, as well as for persons without
any vocational education and unemployed who start training later in the unemployment spell.
However, when looking at the net e®ects over our 30-month observation period after programme
3 The surprisingly large e®ects for females with longer unemployment durations may also be due to young women
reacting to continuing unemployment and/or not being assigned to a programme by becoming pregnant, thus
exploiting the relatively low opportunity costs during (passive) unemployment. On the one hand, the unobserv-
ability of pregnancies at programme start induces selection bias. On the other hand, reacting to nonparticipation
makes these women less likely to be employed after programme start. In both cases the true e®ect of the pro-
grammes on employment will be overestimated. Evidence for the presence and consequences of such incentives
has been provided recently by Wiehler and Lechner (2007) for similar programmes in Austria. Note that the
selection bias is likely to be smaller the shorter the time to treatment within the unemployment spell. This
is substantiated by the absence of positive employment e®ects for women with short unemployment durations
in Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Waller (2006). In our sample time to treatment is relatively short as
well, which may be one explanation why we do not ¯nd positive employment e®ects for women.
3start, it seems unlikely that the programmes are cost-e®ective even for these groups of participants
because net gains in employment (or earnings) are either absent or small.
We use our estimates of the programme e®ects within subgroups of participants as well as
inter-programme comparisons to assess the optimality of the allocation process of jobseekers to
the programmes. We ¯nd supporting evidence for the importance of the assignment mechanism
for the overall e®ectiveness of ALMPs and show that there is scope for improvements in mean
employment rates as well as potential for considerable cost savings by a reallocation of participants
and nonparticipants to the di®erent programmes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background information
on the economic conditions, unemployment insurance and ALMP in West Germany. In Section
3 we present details on the data, the de¯nition of the di®erent programmes as well as the con-
struction of and descriptive statistics for our evaluation sample. In Section 4 we discuss our
identi¯cation and estimation strategy for the e®ects of interest. Section 5 contains all results as
well as a summary of our sensitivity checks. Section 6 concludes. An appendix that is available
in the internet contains further details on the data, methodology and results.
2 Economic conditions and labour market policy in West
Germany
2.1 Economic development since 1990
West Germany experienced a boom directly after uni¯cation in 1990 because of substantial East
German spending diverted away from domestic products to previously unavailable West German
goods. Registered unemployment declined to a rate of 6% in 1991 despite a signi¯cant growth
of the labour force due to migration from East Germany and East Europe to West Germany.4
At the same time, the world economy was experiencing a recession. In 1992, this recession also
began to a®ect West Germany because of its large export share. Already one year later, the West
4 Annual migration from East to West Germany during 1989 and 1990 amounted to about 2% of the East German
population (Akerlof, Rose, Yellen, and Hessenius, 1991).
4German economy was in recession with GDP declining by almost 2% in 1993 and unemployment
rising to 8%. With the recovery of the world economy in the late 1990s, the situation also began
to improve in West Germany. Registered unemployment fell from almost 11% in 1997 to about
8% in 2000. However, economic growth decelerated following the slowdown of the world economy
after September 11, 2001, and registered unemployment returned to about 10% in 2005. Since
2005, the West German economy is recovering slowly.5
2.2 Unemployment insurance in West Germany
In Germany, unemployment insurance (UI) covers all employees. Persons who have contributed
for at least 12 months within the 3 years before becoming unemploymed are eligible for unemploy-
ment bene¯ts (UB), which they receive only if they register with the public employment service
(PES). The minimum UB entitlement is 6 months. In the period under consideration, the maxi-
mum claim increased stepwise with the total duration of the contributions in the 7 years before
becoming unemployed, and age, up to a maximum of 32 months at age 54 or above with previous
contributions of at least 64 months. Since 1994, the replacement rate is 67% of previous average
net earnings from insured employment with dependent children, and 60% without. Actual pay-
ment of UB is conditional on active job search, regular show-up at the PES, and participation
in labour market programmes. In case of noncompliance with bene¯t conditions, sanctions, i.e.
reductions in or suspensions of bene¯ts, can be imposed.
Until 2005, unemployed could become eligible for unemployment assistance (UA) after exhaus-
tion of UB. In contrast to UB, UA was means tested and potentially inde¯nite. However, like
UB, UA was proportional to previous earnings but with lower replacement rates than UB (57%
and 53% with and without dependent children, respectively). Unemployed who were ineligible
for UB and UA could receive social assistance, which was a ¯xed monthly payment unrelated to
previous earnings, means-tested and administered by local authorities.
5 All numbers are taken from BA (2001-2006) or Wunsch (2006).
5One important feature of German labour market policy has always been that (most) programme
participations extend the period for which UB can potentially be drawn. The extension occurs
either directly by explicitly counting programme participation in the same way as insured em-
ployment towards the acquisition of UB claims, or it occurs indirectly by receiving a di®erent
form of bene¯t (so-called maintenance allowance, MA, during participation in certain types of
training). MA is of the same amount as UB (or UA) during participation without or only less
than proportionately reducing the UB claim at programme start. Since 1998, all major reforms
of German labour market policy have reduced the possibilities to renew or extent UB claims
by programme participation as legislators have increasingly become aware of the adverse e®ects
these rules can have on search intensity and the budget of the PES.
2.3 West German ALMP after the 1998 reform
Table 1 provides numbers on the use of and expenditure on the most important active measures in
West Germany. In terms of the number of participants, so-called training measures (TM), which
have been introduced with the 1998 reform and provide basic job search assistance or minor
adjustment of skills, have become the most important activation measure, by far. Expenditures
are moderate because durations are short (up to 3 months but usually no more than 2 months;
see also Table 2). Support of self-employment has also gained importance in recent years while
use of subsidised employment is declining, both in the number of entries and in durations and
expenditure. The latter consists of both subsidised non-market jobs, and temporary wage sub-
sidies paid to employers who provide regular jobs to unemployed people during the ¯rst months
of employment to compensate for initial de¯cits in productivity. Short-time work, which is a
reduction in work hours combined with a subsidy from the unemployment insurance system to
compensate the resulting earnings loss, is also of minor importance although relative expenditure
has increased somewhat.
6Table 1: The most important instruments of ALMP in West Germany 2000-2005
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Expenditure in million EUR
Total expenditure on ALMP 8277 8536 8264 8054 7398 5251
Share in per cent
Training measures (TM) 2 2 3 5 2 2
Further vocational training (FVT) 51 52 48 38 23 23
Short-time work 3 4 6 7 7 7
Employment programmes (EP) 14 12 8 6 2 2
Temporary wage subsidies 11 7 10 8 3 3
Support of self-employment 6 7 9 16 44 44
Other 12 16 15 21 19 19
Entries in 1000
Training measures (TM) 286 319 513 690 789 607
Further vocational training (FVT) 338 242 259 161 124 91
Short-time work 59 94 162 160 122 101
Employment programmes (EP) 90 73 63 39 41 17
Temporary wage subsidies 120 101 115 96 95 85
Support of self-employment 62 65 89 178 249 188
Source: BA (2001-2006).
Note: The numbers for 2005 are not comparable due to a complete change in
legislation and statistics.
Further vocational training has always been on of the most important instruments of West
German ALMP, though the number of participants has declined considerably in recent years.
Expenditure on FVT is substantial, given the number of participants, for two reasons. First,
with durations of up to two years, training programmes are relatively long in Germany compared
to most OECD countries. Second, participants usually receive a special form of bene¯t (so-called
maintenance allowance, MA) while in the programme, which is of the same amount as UB or UA.
Besides the usual counselling and placement services, there are also special instruments for
youth, elderly unemployed and the disabled in Germany (included in Other expenditure in Table
1). For further details on these measures and German UI see Wunsch (2006).
One important feature of German ALMP is the large heterogeneity of training courses. Course
contents, the amount of human capital added and planned durations vary considerably, partic-
ularly among FVT courses. With our data, we are able to account for heterogeneity in training
measures and FVT in a detailed way. Table 2 summarises the programme types we evaluate in our
empirical analysis. Besides seven types of training courses, we analyse subsidised non-market jobs.
We do not include temporary wage subsidies and support of self-employment though, because
7our identi¯cation strategy (see Section 4.1) might not be valid for these programmes. Short-time
work is not observable in our data.
Table 2: Description of the programmes to be evaluated
Mean planned
Programme type (acronym) Description duration (days)
Short combined measures (SCM) Acquisition of speci¯c knowledge and skills. 62
Jobseeker assessment (JSA) Assessment of jobseekers' ability and willingness to
search for job and to work, basic job search assistance.
56
Short training (ST) Minor adjustment of skills. 56
Job-related training (JRT) Combined o®-the-job and on-the-job training in a spe-
ci¯c ¯eld of profession.
186
General further training
· 6 months GT6)
General update, adjustment and extension of knowledge




> 6 months (GT6+)
General update, adjustment and extension of knowledge
and skills; mainly o® the job, planned duration > 6
months.
292
Degree course (DC) Vocational training that awards a formal professional
degree and that corresponds to regular vocational train-
ing in the German apprenticeship system.
690
Employment programme (EP) Subsidised non-market jobs. 313
Note: Calculations of the mean planned durations are based on our evaluation sample (see Section 3.2).
Short combined measures (SCM) are a series of very short training courses aiming at removing
speci¯c minor skill de¯cits. Jobseeker assessment (JSA) courses have the main objective of
assessing a jobseeker's availability, willingness, and ability for active job search or speci¯c kinds
of jobs or programmes, but they also provide basic job search assistance. Short training (ST)
courses provide minor adjustments of skills. All three types of programmes belong to the category
of so-called training measures (TM) and have durations of no more than three months with mean
planned durations of about two months.
Job-related training (JRT) combines o®-the-job training with a substantial amount of on-the-
job training in a speci¯c ¯eld of profession, where the latter often takes place in a simulated work
environment rather than a regular ¯rm (so-called practice ¯rms). The mean planned duration
is about six months. General training (GT) subsumes the classical, mainly o®-the-job, further
vocational training courses which provide a general update, adjustment, and extension of knowl-
edge and skills. Planned durations range from only a few months to up to two years. Degree
courses (DC) provide a usually two-year training which is equivalent to an apprenticeship in the
8German apprenticeship system. It awards an o±cially recognised vocational degree if completed
successfully. JRT, GT, and DC belong to the category of further vocational training (FVT).
Employment programmes (EP) are subsidised jobs, which are outside of and should not com-
pete with the regular labour market. They are targeted at unemployed with particularly bad
employment prospects like the elderly or the long-term unemployed or aim at smoothing the
e®ects of large job losses in a region by absorbing the unemployed in subsidised employment.
Participants hold these jobs usually for about one year.
3 Data and de¯nition of the evaluation sample
3.1 The data
We use exceptionally rich administrative data that has been built up by the German Institute for
Employment Research. The database is a 2% random sample from all individuals who have been
subject to German social insurance at least once since 1990. It covers the period 1990 to 2005
and combines spell information from social insurance records, programme participation records
and the bene¯t payment and jobseeker registers of the PES.
The data cover participation in all major German active labour market programmes for the
unemployed from 2000 to mid 2005, and the information about programmes is very detailed so
that it is possible to account for programme heterogeneity in a uniquely detailed way. Besides
being very recent, the database is also very rich in terms of covariate information and observed
pre-programme employment histories (at least 10 years) to control for selectivity in programme
participation (see Section 4.1).
Nevertheless, the database also has several drawbacks that may be important for the interpre-
tation of our results. Firstly, exact information on direct programme costs is not available in the
data. Therefore, we have to rely on very rough measures of these costs when trying to draw some
conclusions on the net e®ects of the programmes. Secondly, prior to 2000 there is no explicit
9information on participation in ALMP except for bene¯t payments (MA) during training. In
particular, it is not possible to distinguish subsidised from non-subsidised employment. Thirdly,
the common observation period after programme start is relatively short (only 2.5 years) since
we are interested in relatively recent programmes conducted 2000-2002. Because of the rather
long durations of some programmes (see Table 2), Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006, 2008)
show that the ability to measure long-run e®ects is crucial for the evaluation of German ALMP.
However, their results also imply that after 30 months we can already get a reasonable idea about
the magnitude of possible long-term e®ects, at least for the shorter programmes.
3.2 De¯nition of our evaluation sample and programme participation
Our initial sample consists of the in°ow into unemployment from insured employment or out of
labour force between January 2000 and the ¯rst half of December 2002.6 Focusing on the prime-
age part of the West German population and to avoid most in°uences coming from retirement,
early retirement, and primary education, we impose an age restriction (25-49 years). Moreover,
concentrating on the main body of the active labour force, we exclude unemployed who were
trainees, home workers, apprentices or without previous employment, as well as unemployed
with an intensity of the last employment before programme participation below half of the usual
full-time working hours.
To ensure eligibility, we require that all individuals received unemployment bene¯ts (UB) or
assistance (UA) directly before programme start.7 According to German legislation, this is also
the main target group of German ALMP. However, drawing this subpopulation requires the use of
variables measured relatively to programme start, which is only available for participants. In this
paper, we use an adapted version of one of the approaches suggested by Lechner (1999, 2002b) to
simulate start dates for nonparticipants. We regress the log time to treatment within the unem-
6 If there are multiple entries into unemployment, we consider the ¯rst one as the sample in°ow date.
7 In fact, receipt of UB or UA directly before entering a programme is not su±cient to ensure eligibility. In
general, individuals must also have a vocational degree or at least three years of work experience. Since receipt
of UB or UA implies that a person has been employed for at least one year in the past, the remaining group of
participants and nonparticipants is most likely to be eligible.
10ployment spell of participants on a set of time invariant personal and regional characteristics and
use the estimated coe±cients plus a draw in the residual distribution to predict a corresponding
value for nonparticipants. Thus, by ¯nding a control observation, that is still eligible and, hence,
comparable at the assigned start date within the unemployment spell, the simulation is a kind of
¯rst matching step with respect to elapsed unemployment duration until (potential) treatment.8
Moreover, to minimise the e®ect of simulating start dates for nonparticipants we measure all vari-
ables (except time to treatment) at or relatively to the beginning of the unemployment spell in
which (potential) treatment takes place rather than at or relatively to (hypothetical) programme
start.
We de¯ne participants as those unemployed who participate at least once in a programme in
the 18 months following the in°ow date into our sample. Accordingly, nonparticipants are all
persons who do not enter a programme in this period. For them we also require that they received
UB or UA at simulated programme start. Since we observe outcomes only up to mid 2005, we
only evaluate the ¯rst participation of a person in a programme that occurs within the 18-month
window and if it occurred before 2003. We extensively checked the sensitivity of our results to
the choice of the treatment window (see Section 5.6).
3.3 Selected descriptive statistics
In Table 3 we present selected descriptive statistics for all 9 treatment groups (for a full list
of variables and statistics, see the internet appendix). The numbers indicate that programme
participation is highly selective. The most pronounced di®erences appear for EP, GT6+ and DC.
In EP, women are underrepresented while blue-collar workers and people with health problems,
low earnings, no bene¯t claims and large shares of unemployment in the employment history
are overrepresented. Moreover, EP are used in regions with particularly high unemployment
8 By deleting non-treated observations that do not ful¯l the eligibility condition, we cannot get a consistent
estimate of the average treatment e®ect for the population, but the average treatment e®ect on the treated,
which is the parameter we are interested in, can still be recovered from the data because none of the programme
participants is removed by this procedure.
11rates. In contrast, participants in GT6+ have fewer health problems, are better educated, have
higher earnings and bene¯t claims as well as more favourable employment histories than the
other treatment groups. Participants in DC are, on average, youngest, exhibit the largest share
of people without a vocational education as well as the largest fraction of out-of-labour force
status in their employment history.
Table 3: Means and shares (in %) of selected variables
NP EP SCM JSA ST GT6 GT6+ DC JRT
Observations 15013 211 846 960 657 551 772 415 558
Personal characteristics
Age (years) 37 37 37 36 37 38 37 34 38
Female 41 34 46 40 48 48 43 42 42
Foreigner 14 11 13 13 11 8 10 12 12
Health problems 15 18 19 17 13 12 10 12 19
No vocational education 35 45 38 43 28 28 21 51 40
Completed apprenticeship 58 45 58 53 63 67 64 44 59
University/polytechnic college degree 7 9 4 4 9 5 15 4 1
White-collar worker 23 14 17 19 17 15 13 19 18
Blue-collar worker 35 50 37 40 29 27 20 41 44
Remaining unemployment bene¯t claim
No claim 45 62 55 48 47 29 26 34 41
Claim (days) 123 66 81 106 103 173 175 142 139
Ten-year pre-programme employment history
Time to treatment (months) 4 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 6
Fraction employed 70 51 68 67 72 71 72 65 69
Fraction unemployed 13 27 13 13 10 11 10 11 14
Fraction out of labour force 16 17 16 17 15 15 15 21 14
Last monthly earnings (EUR) 1811 1567 1739 1722 1860 1849 2021 1787 1669
Regional information
Local unemployment rate > 10% 39 54 37 47 38 37 39 43 40
Predicted probability to be employed without participation**
Mean 23 17 19 19 20 25 27 21 20
Median 18 12 14 15 17 20 23 17 17
33%-Quantile 11 7 9 9 10 13 15 11 10
67%-Quantile 28 21 23 23 25 32 33 26 25
Correlation with participation -12* -24* -20* -15* 9* 11* -5* -9*
probability***
Note: If not stated otherwise, entries are in percent. All variables except time to treatment are measured at
or relative to the beginning of the unemployment spell in which (simulated) programme start takes
place. Time to treatment is measured at (simulated) programme start. *Correlation is signi¯cant on
the 5% level. **Predicted probabilities from a probit estimation among nonparticipants. Dependent
variable: Employed in unsubsidised employment with at least 90% of the last pre.programme earnings,
measured in half-month 60 after programme start. ***Predicted probability to participate in the
respective programme or not to participate at all. Correlation computed in the population.
To obtain a better understanding of how selection into di®erent programmes works with respect
to employment prospects, we predict the employment chances the di®erent groups of participants
would have had without the programme, conditional on a rich set of covariates. This prediction
is based on a probit estimation of the employment chances of nonparticipants at the end of the
12observation period. We only consider employment that generates at least 90% of the earnings
from the last job before entering unemployment. As explanatory variables we use all variables
that are important in the selection models for the di®erent programme participations versus
nonparticipation. This includes personal characteristics, variables that summarise individual
pre-programme employment histories and regional characteristics.
The lower part of Table 3 shows that by various measures EP, SCM and JSA received the
most di±cult cases in terms of reemployment chances. These programmes as well as ST exhibit a
rather strong negative correlation of the predicted employment probability with the participation
probability in the respective programme. For DC and JRT this correlation is negative as well
but not as strong. In contrast, for both forms of general training there is a positive correlation
implying that these programmes attract the better risks with respect to employment prospects.
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NP EP SCM JSA ST G T6 GT6+ DC JRT
Note: Month zero is the (simulated) programme start. Negative values on the abscissa refer
to months before programme start, positive values to the months thereafter.
In Figure 1 we compare the (unsubsidised) employment rates of the di®erent treatment groups
before and after programme start without correcting for any selectivity. By construction of our
sample, the employment rates are zero at and directly before programme start. Participants in
EP have considerably lower employment rates before programme start than the other treatment
13groups, which have relatively similar rates. Here, the only notable di®erence is that the deteri-
oration of the employment rate starts somewhat later for nonparticipants than for participants.
After programme start, the employment rate of nonparticipants shows the fastest recovery. The
rates of participants follow in the order of programme duration with the shortest programmes
recovering earliest. However, none of the treatment groups reaches its pre-programme level. At
the end of the observation period, participants in EP show particulary low employment rates,
followed by participants in DC, JSA and SCM. The other groups of participants end up with
similar employment rates as nonparticipants 2.5 years after programme start.
4 Identi¯cation and estimation
4.1 Conditional independence
We are interested in the average e®ects of a programme on its participants compared to partici-
pation in another programme or no participation at all. To identify these parameters we rely on
the conditional independence assumption to solve the selection problem that arises from the fact
that persons in the di®erent treatments di®er systematically in a way that might be related to
the outcome variables of interest (see Section 3.3). The assumption states that if we can observe
all factors that jointly in°uence outcomes in the comparison state and the participation decision,
then - conditional on these factors - participation and the outcomes, which the participants would
have obtained in the comparison state, are independent, and the e®ects of interest are identi¯ed
(Rubin, 1974; Imbens, 2000; Lechner, 2001, 2002a,b).
Programme participation is determined by eligibility, selection by caseworkers and self-selection
by potential participants. Eligibility is ensured by the choice of our evaluation sample (see Sec-
tion 3.2). Given eligibility, based on an assessment of the employment prospects and the speci¯c
de¯cits or needs of the unemployed the caseworker decides - usually in consultation with the can-
didate - on programme participation. According to German legislation, caseworkers have to take
into account the chances of the unemployed for completing the programme successfully, and local
14labour market conditions. To account for the latter, we supplemented the data with rich regional
information which include federal state, local unemployment rate, demographic and industry
structure, tax revenue, income, migration, infrastructure and urbanity. Individual variables in
our data capturing information about employment prospects and chances for successful comple-
tion of a programme include age, educational attainment, family and health status, characteristics
of the desired job, compliance with bene¯t conditions, the number of placement propositions by
the PES as well as employment histories for at least 10 years before the programme. The lat-
ter include information on employment status, employers, earnings, occupational status, speci¯c
occupation, and industry.
From the point of view of the unemployed, his decision whether or not to participate in a
programme is guided by considerations very similar to those of the caseworker, but there are also
additional reasons for joining or not joining a programme. If, for example, the unemployed sees
no chance to ¯nd a job with or without a programme, he may prefer not to join a programme that
reduces his leisure time. This again requires controlling for all factors that determine individual
employment prospects and labour market conditions. Moreover, legislation provides rather strong
incentives to participate. On the one hand, unemployed who refuse to join a programme, risk
suspension of their unemployment bene¯ts. On the other hand, most programmes count towards
acquisition of new unemployment bene¯t claims (see Section 2.2). Therefore, we include a variable
that indicates the UB claim at the beginning of an unemployment spell.
The internet appendix, contains a complete list of all variables that are available in the data. In
contrast to administrative data previously available for Germany, we observe whether a jobseeker
has health problems or a disability a®ecting employability. We also observe a set of characteristics
of the job the unemployed is looking for, the number of placement propositions by the PES, as
well as information on bene¯t sanctions and compliance with bene¯t conditions (e.g. attendance
at interview with PES or cooperation with PES sta®). Thus, though we are still not able to
observe soft characteristics like motivation and ability of the unemployed directly, we have a set
15of previously unavailable important proxy variables, and we are able to capture their indirect
e®ects on 10 years of pre-programme employment histories.
4.2 Estimation
All possible parametric, semi- and nonparametric estimators of treatment e®ects with observa-
tional data are built on the principle that for every comparison of two programmes, for participants
in the programme of interest, we need comparison observations from the other programme with
the same distribution of relevant characteristics. Characteristics are relevant if they jointly in°u-
ence selection and outcomes (see Section 4.1 for these variables). Here, we use adjusted propensity
score matching estimators for multiple treatments as our baseline estimator to produce such com-
parisons. A clear advantage of these estimators is that they are essentially nonparametric and
that they allow for arbitrary individual e®ect heterogeneity.9
To obtain estimates of the conditional choice probabilities (the so-called propensity scores),
which we use in our selection correction mechanism to form our comparison groups, we estimate
probit models for all comparisons (all programmes against each other as well as nonparticipa-
tion). The analysis revealed that gender, age, quali¯cation, family status, health and compliance
with bene¯t conditions are important individual characteristics that determine participation.
Furthermore, observed employment and unemployment histories are signi¯cantly correlated with
participation choice. Moreover, the characteristics of the job an unemployed is looking for as well
as regional information, which entered the probits in a highly disaggregated way to capture the
speci¯cs of supply and demand in the local labour market, play important roles in the selection
process. Finally, remaining unemployment bene¯t claims indeed seem to provide rather strong
incentives to enter a programme.
We use a matching procedure that incorporates the improvements suggested by Lechner,
Miquel, and Wunsch (2006). To allow for higher precision when many `good' comparison ob-
9 See Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) for matching with multiple treatments. For matching with binary
treatments see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
16servations are available, they incorporate the idea of calliper or radius matching (e.g. Dehejia
and Wahba, 2002) into the standard algorithm used for example by Ger¯n and Lechner (2002).
Second, matching quality is increased by exploiting the fact that appropriate weighted regressions
that use the sampling weights from matching have the so-called double robustness property. This
property implies that the estimator remains consistent if either the matching step is based on
a correctly speci¯ed selection model, or the regression model is correctly speci¯ed (e.g. Rubin,
1979; Jo®e, Ten Have, Feldman, and Kimmel, 2004). Moreover, this procedure may reduce small
sample bias as well as asymptotic bias of matching estimators (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006)
and thus increase robustness of the estimator. For more information on this estimator and its
performance see Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006) as well as the internet appendix.
5 Results
5.1 Measurement of the labour market outcomes
According to German legislation, the main objective of German ALMP is to reduce unemployment
by improving the chances of the unemployed to ¯nd regular, unsubsidised employment. But there
may also be other objectives like preventing or reducing human capital depreciation, keeping
the unemployed attached to the labour market or providing social contacts and organised daily
routines by `keeping them busy' in subsidised employment or training programmes without the
direct prospect of ¯nding a regular job.
We try to capture the di®erent aspects of the potential e®ectiveness of the programmes by
considering a variety of outcome variables. The outcome unsubsidised employment measures the
programmes' success in helping their participants to ¯nd regular employment. We also assess the
quality of employment in terms of tenure and stability of the earnings compared with previous
jobs as well as potential gains in productivity measured by actual earnings di®erences. In contrast,
registered unemployment, which here includes programme participation, measures whether indi-
vidual unemployment is indeed reduced. The outcome programme participation assesses whether
17the programme participation we evaluate changes the probability of future participation in the
same or a di®erent programme. Moreover, we measure whether participants are better o® in
terms of total earnings, i.e. the sum of earnings from subsidised and unsubsidised employment
and any bene¯ts from the PES.
To assess some of the programme costs, received bene¯ts measures the bene¯ts and subsidies
paid by the PES to the unemployed. This outcome variable includes all bene¯ts (UB, UA,
MA) received during participation in training courses and 60% of the wages from subsidised
employment. The latter is a conservative proxy for subsidies paid by the PES, since that share
is not directly observable in the data.
All e®ects are measured half-monthly based on time relative to (simulated) programme start,
because whether to start a programme or not is the policy question of interest. Moreover, focus-
ing on the beginning instead of the end takes into account the potential endogeneity of actual
programme duration. Below we present ¯gures displaying the average programme e®ects for the
programme participants of the di®erent programmes for various outcome variables. Each line in
the respective ¯gure represents a di®erent programme and relates to the e®ects for the speci¯c
population of participants in that programme. Dots appear on a particular line if the e®ect is
point-wise signi¯cant on the 5%-level. Outcomes are either measured in percentage points when
they relate to changes in labour market status, or in di®erences of EUR when they relate to some
earnings variable. The results are displayed for every half-month after the programme start, but
the labeling on the corresponding axes refers to the respective month after the start of the pro-
gramme. In the ¯gures presented below, we only focus on the comparisons with nonparticipation.
Extensive inter-programme comparisons are available in the internet appendix of this paper, as
well as in one of the following tables.
185.2 The e®ects of programme participation
Figure 2 shows that none of the programmes succeeds in improving the chances of their partici-
pants to ¯nd regular, unsubsidised employment within our 30-month observation period. After
the typical lock-in e®ects, only SCM, ST, GT6 and JRT recover relatively quickly but, still, fail to
produce any signi¯cant gains in employment. The longer programmes, EP, GT6+ and DC recover
only very slowly and exhibit negative employment e®ects compared to nonparticipation even 2.5
years after programme start. JSA, which is a very short programme and should, therefore, only
show a small lock-in e®ect, displays a substantial negative e®ect for most of the observation pe-
riod. Below, we will show that future programme participations of the participants in JSA are
largely responsible for this ¯nding.















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
EP SCM JSA ST GT6 G T6+ DC JRT
EP sig. SCM sig. JSA sig. ST sig. GT6 sig. G T6+ sig. DC sig. JRT sig.
Note: Abscissa: Months after programme start. Ordinate: E®ect in %-points. Each line
represents the respective population of participants, which di®ers for each programme.
Dots indicate that the e®ect is signi¯cant on the 5% level (sig.).
Overall it seems that the employment rates of all programmes stop recovering towards the end
of the observation period, so that there is so far no indication that positive employment e®ects
can be expected for later periods.
19When looking at the net e®ects of the programmes by cumulating the half-monthly employment
e®ects over the full 30-month period we ¯nd that, with the exception of SCM and ST, participants
face losses in unsubsidised employment between 2 months for the shorter programmes and 10
months for DC (see Table 4). When taking into account the quality of employment in terms of
stability (more than 6 months employed) and earnings (at least 90% of previous earnings) the
losses are somewhat smaller. For total employment, which includes subsidised employment, the
picture is very similar, except for EP because the programme itself is counted as (subsidised)
employment.
Table 4: Cumulated e®ects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation
EP SCM JSA ST GT6 GT6+ DC JRT
Observations 211 846 960 657 551 772 415 558
Cumulated e®ects in months
Unsubsidised employment (USE) -5.5* -0.1 -2.2* -0.5 -2.4* -6.1* -9.9* -2.0*
Stable USE
a -3.6* 0.0 -1.4* -0.2 -1.7* -4.8* -6.7* -1.4*
USE with stable earnings
b -3.4* 0.4 -1.6* -0.4 -1.9* -3.6* -5.6* -1.4*
Total employment
c 7.4* 0.6 -1.7* 0.3 -1.9* -5.6* -10.1* -1.5*
Unemployment 8.3* 2.2* 3.9* 2.1* 4.1* 8.2* 13.0* 4.4*
Programme participation
d 0.2 2.1* 3.2* 2.5* 1.1* 0.8* -0.1 0.7*
Not passively unemployed
e 7.4* 3.6* 4.5* 3.2* 2.8* 3.6* 9.5* 4.7*
Cumulated e®ects in EUR
Received bene¯ts
f 7054* 1367* 2236* 1535* 2751* 5994* 7197* 2479*
Earnings from USE -8615* 589 -4282* -1511 -4582* -12778* -16276* -3640*
Total earnings
g 4616* 2473* -1544 702 -1198 -5813* -9085* -233
Approximate direct programme costs per participant in EUR
Direct costs
h - 570 570 570 2400 5400 12000 3600
Note:
a Employed for more than 6 consecutive months (common probation period in Germany).
b Employed
with earnings of at least 90% of the last pre-programme earnings.
c Subsidised and unsubsidised em-
ployment.
d Programme participation excluding the one we evaluate.
e All types of employment and
programme participation.
f UB, UA, MA payments and 60% of earnings from subsidised employment.
g All earnings and bene¯ts.
h Calculated from total expenditure, number of programme entrants and
average durations (BA, 2001-2006). * E®ect is signi¯cant on the 5% level.
From Figure 3 we see that in addition to the absence of positive employment e®ects, the pro-
grammes exhibit strong adverse e®ects on registered unemployment (which includes programme
participation). The short training measures and EP do not at all or hardly recover after pro-
gramme start and the longer training programmes only recover very slowly. Moreover, with the
exception of GT6, all programmes exhibit signi¯cantly higher unemployment rates for their par-
ticipants compared to nonparticipation, even after 2.5 years. For SCM, JSA, ST and GT6+ the
di®erence levels o® at 5-10%-points, while for EP and DC it still persists at 20%-points towards
20the end of our observation period. However, for the shorter programmes the overall accumulation
of unemployment is moderate with 2-4 months, but for EP and GT6+ with 8 months and DC
with even 13 months the implicit costs of the programmes in terms of prolonged unemployment
are substantial (see Table 4).

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
EP SCM JSA ST GT6 G T6+ DC JRT
EP sig. SCM sig. JSA sig. ST sig. GT6 sig. G T6+ sig. DC sig. JRT sig.
Note: Registered unemployment includes programme participation. Abscissa: Months after
programme start. Ordinate: E®ect in %-points. Each line represents the respective
population of participants, which di®ers for each programme. Dots indicate that the
e®ect is signi¯cant on the 5% level (sig.).
Figure 4 provides an explanation for why especially the short measures fare particularly badly
with respect to registered unemployment. Compared with nonparticipants, a substantially larger
fraction of participants in SCM, JSA and ST exhibits future participations, which are counted
as unemployment, and many participants attend another programme shortly after completing
the ¯rst one. In total, they accumulate 2-3 more months of future programme participation
than nonparticipants (see Table 4). Participants in GT6+ also show a non-negligible amount of
additional participations. For JRT and GT6 the di®erence in further programme participation is
noticeably lower and becomes insigni¯cant after 2 years.
Table 5 provides more detailed insights on future programme participations of the participants
and nonparticipants in our sample. The latter may attend programmes after the end of the
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EP SCM JSA ST GT6 G T6+ DC JRT
EP sig. SCM sig. JSA sig. ST sig. GT6 sig. G T6+ sig. DC sig. JRT sig.
Note: Abscissa: Months after programme start. Ordinate: E®ect in %-points. Each line
represents the respective population of participants, which di®ers for each programme.
Dots indicate that the e®ect is signi¯cant on the 5% level (sig.).
18-month window we use to de¯ne treatment status. From the last column of Table 5 we see
that 16% of nonparticipants and 20-45% of participants attend some other programme in the 30
months after programme start. The relatively large numbers for participants re°ect the repeated
use of training measures, in particular of JSA, as well as increased promotion of becoming self-
employed in recent years (included in Other). Moreover, temporary wage subsidies (TWS) are
often used to ease the transition to regular employment after completing a programme.
Table 5: Further programme participation (in % of treatment group)
: At least
Treatment status (acronym) EP SCM JSA ST GT DC JRT TWS Other : one
Nonparticipation (NP) 1 2 3 2 1 1 0 2 7 : 16
Employment programme (EP) 6 6 5 6 4 1 2 3 7 : 30
Short combined measures (SCM) 2 9 4 4 5 5 5 7 14 : 41
Jobseeker assessment (JSA) 1 3 12 3 8 9 3 7 17 : 45
Short training (ST) 2 2 6 10 7 5 3 10 16 : 44
General training (GT) 1 3 5 6 4 1 1 7 14 : 34
Degree course (DC) 1 3 5 6 3 1 1 7 15 : 18
Job-related training (JRT) 0 1 3 3 2 3 1 1 7 : 30
Note: TWS: temporary wage subsidies. The largest fraction of Other is support of self-employment.
Unfortunately, the sample sizes in our data do not allow us to use a dynamic treatment eval-
uation approach as suggested by Lechner and Miquel (2001, 2005) to account for sequential
22programme participation. Therefore, we have to pursue less ambitious objectives. In this study,
we evaluate the ¯rst programme participation within an unemployment spell and treat future
participations as (part of the) outcome variable. Thus, we basically evaluate a sequence of one or
more programmes and variable length and composition which starts with a particular programme.
Because we only restrict the ¯rst part of the sequence and since we measure outcomes beginning
with the ¯rst period after programme start rather than relative to the end of the programme, a
static evaluation approach is able to account for the relevant selection problem. But, of course,
the estimated parameters are very di®erent from those obtained from a dynamic approach. It
may be the case that some particular sequences of programmes turn out to be e®ective in im-
proving the employment chances of their participants, and that, because of prolonged periods of
participation, our observation period is merely too short to detect ¯rst indications of such e®ects.
However, so far our results do not substantiate such a conjecture because the employment e®ects
seem to stop recovering towards the end of our observation period for virtually all programmes.
Are there any other e®ects the programmes might have? In Table 4 we present estimates
of the di®erence in accumulated months not passively unemployed, which counts all types of
employment and programme participation. According to this measure, participants experience
3-9 more months than nonparticipants which provide daily routines, social contacts, require
e®ort and keep them `busy' or `o® the street'. Furthermore, in times of high and persistent
unemployment, programme participation may also be used to increase disposable incomes. From
the estimates for total earnings in Table 4 we see, however, that such an e®ect is only present for
participants in SCM and EP. For the other programmes the losses in earnings from unsubsidised
employment are too large to be compensated by bene¯t payments and subsidised earnings.
To complete our assessment of the programmes we estimate the direct costs of programme par-
ticipation compared to nonparticipation in terms of cumulated bene¯t payments and expenditure
on wage subsidies (both included in Received bene¯ts in Table 4). These costs are substantial,
ranging from about 1500 EUR for SCM and ST to more than 7000 EUR for EP and DC. We
23also provide numbers for the direct costs of the programmes,10 for which we only have a very
rough measure, though. Based on this measure, the absence of positive e®ects on unsubsidised
employment implies total net costs of programme participation of, at best, 2000 EUR per partic-
ipant for SCM and, at worst, 20000 EUR per participant for DC (without discounting and not
accounting for tax or general equilibrium e®ects). These numbers are immense and provide a
rather pessimistic view on the more recent West German labour market programmes.
5.3 Are there groups of participants that bene¯t from the programmes?
Despite the rather discouraging evidence on the average e®ectiveness of the programmes, we
investigate whether there are some groups of participants for which the programmes improve
their employment chances. For this purpose, we estimate the e®ects of the programmes on
unsubsidised employment for di®erent subgroups of participants de¯ned by gender, age, local
unemployment rate and industry quota. For none of these groups we ¯nd positive employment
e®ects (see the internet appendix for all details).
We also divide our sample into participants with and without a vocational education (appren-
ticeship, college/university degree). For the latter group we obtain a positive e®ect of ST on
unsubsidised employment at a magnitude of 10%-points after about 12 months after programme
start (see panel (a) of Figure 5). Table 6 shows that over the 30-month period this results in gains
of 2 months in employment and almost 3500 EUR in (gross) earnings relative to nonparticipants,
at a cost of about 1000 EUR (estimate for bene¯ts not signi¯cant, though).
We ¯nd, however, that the positive e®ect of ST seems to be largely driven by participants
in ST remaining in a job that was formerly subsidised by temporary wage subsidies (see the
internet appendix for all details). To check whether the positive e®ects we obtain merely re°ect
incentives of employers to keep formerly subsidised employees for the minimum legal period after
which they do not have to repay (part of) the subsidy,11 we rede¯ne our outcome variable by not
10 These comprise the direct cost of training courses, which are reimbursed to the providers of training. Expenses
on PES sta® are not included. Therefore, the number for EP is zero.
11 When a job formerly subsidised by temporary wage subsidies is terminated by the employer without good reason
24counting periods of unsubsidised employment which lie within this legal repayment period. Panel
(b) of Figure 5 shows that the e®ect is somewhat reduced but it does not vanish, implying that
ST, potentially in combination with temporary wage subsidies, seems to succeed in generating
positive employment e®ect for individuals without a vocational education.
Figure 5: E®ects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation:
individuals without a vocational education
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
EP SCM JSA ST GT6 GT6+ DC JRT
EP sig. SCM sig. JSA sig. ST sig. GT6 sig. GT6+ sig. DC sig. JRT sig.
Note: In panel (b) we only count unsubsidised employment after holding a job subsidised by temporary wage
subsidies for at least the same period but no more than 12 months after the end of subsidisation
period. Abscissa: Months after programme start. Ordinate: E®ect in %-points. Each line represents
the respective population of participants, which di®ers for each programme. Dots indicate that the
e®ect is signi¯cant on the 5% level (sig.). See the internet appendix for the number of observations in
each group.
When dividing our sample according to time to treatment within the unemployment spell we
¯nd positive employment e®ects for unemployed starting a programme after 5 months for short
general training (GT6), which become signi¯cant close to the end of the observation period. There
is also some indication of positive e®ects for SCM for this group (see Figure 6). In fact, there is
a small gain of one month in unsubsidised employment with stable earnings for this programme
(see Table 6).
As a ¯nal check we split our sample at the median of the no-programme employment index we
generated for characterising participants and nonparticipants (see Section 3.3). The estimation
results for unsubsidised employment are displayed in Figure 7. Panel (b) shows that for par-
ticipants with relatively goods employment prospects the negative lock-in e®ects are particulary
within a period of the same length as the subsidisation period but no more than 12 months, the employer has
to repay (part of) the subsidy.
25large. Hence, consistent with the evidence of Lechner and Wunsch (2006b) on the impact of
overall employment prospects in terms of labour market conditions we show that the size of the
lock-in e®ects is also positively related to individual employment prospects. Moreover, we ¯nd
that rather substantial negative employment e®ects persist for most of the programmes even in
the longer run so that participation turns out to be rather harmful.
Figure 6: E®ects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation:
unsubsidised employment
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
EP SCM JSA ST GT6 GT6+ DC JRT
EP sig. SCM sig. JSA sig. ST sig. GT6 sig. GT6+ sig. DC sig. JRT sig.
Note: Time to treatment is the number of months from the beginning of the unemployment spell until
(simulated) programme start. Abscissa: Months after programme start. Ordinate: E®ect in %-points.
Each line represents the respective population of participants, which di®ers for each programme. Dots
indicate that the e®ect is signi¯cant on the 5% level (sig.). See the internet appendix for the number
of observations in each group.
Table 6: Cumulated e®ects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation
for di®erent subgroups of participants and selected programmes
Unsubsidised employment (USE) Earnings Bene¯ts Direct
Total Stable With stable earnings from USE Unemployment received costs
No vocational education
ST 2.0* 1.9* 1.2 3393 0.5 564 570
Time to treatment ¸ 5 months
SCM 0.5 0.4 0.9 1867 0.4 507 570
GT6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -510 3.0* 2233* 2400
Employment index below median
SCM 0.8 0.5 0.5 2348* 1.7* 856 570
ST 0.7 0.5 0.3 1913 1.4 1001 570
GT6 -1.3 -1.0 -0.9 -1796 2.8* 1679* 2400
JRT 0.0 -0.2 0.0 634 2.9* 1651* 3600
Note: See below Table 4. Cumulated employment and unemployment e®ects in months.
Earnings, bene¯ts and approximate direct programme costs in EUR. USE: unsub-
sidised employment. * (Italics) e®ect is signi¯cant on the 5% (10%) level.
For participants with worse a-priori employment prospects the picture is less pessimistic. The
lock-in e®ects are considerably lower and, with the exception of EP, none of the programmes harms
26participants in the longer run. JRT even succeeds in increasing chances to ¯nd regular employment
at a magnitude of 5-7%-points after about 20 months after programme start. Furthermore, it
seems that SCM, ST and GT6 have some positive e®ects as well, though they seem to be not
large enough to become signi¯cant with the limited sample sizes in this subgroup of participants.
Yet, Table 6 shows that SCM actually generates a positive net gain in earnings from unsubsidised
employment of almost 2500 EUR.
Figure 7: E®ects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation:
unsubsidised employment
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
EP SCM JSA ST GT6 GT6+ DC JRT
EP sig. SCM sig. JSA sig. ST sig. GT6 sig. GT6+ sig. DC sig. JRT sig.
Note: The employment index is equal to the predicted probabilities from a probit in the pool of nonpartic-
ipants. Dependent variable: employed in unsubsidised employment with at least 90% of the earnings
of the last job before programme start, measured in half-month 60 after programme start. Abscissa:
Months after programme start. Ordinate: E®ect in %-points. Each line represents the respective pop-
ulation of participants, which di®ers for each programme. Dots indicate that the e®ect is signi¯cant
on the 5% level (sig.). See the internet appendix for the number of observations in each group.
To conclude, there are some groups or participants for which some of the shorter programmes
exhibit positive e®ects on unsubsidised employment. However, overall it seem unlikely that any
of the programmes is cost-e®ective even for these participants because net gains in employment
or earnings are either absent or small compared with the cost of programme participation.
5.4 Why were the previous results more positive?
Using similar Geman data and applying a similar methodology, Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch
(2006) ¯nd, after the typical lock-in e®ects, lasting positive employment e®ects for short training
(up to 6 months planned duration, ST), long training (more than 6 months, LT) and retraining
27(comparable to degree courses, RT) conducted 1993-1994 under the old legislation. They also
look at practice ¯rms (PF), for which they do not ¯nd positive e®ects.12 To compare our re-
sults with these earlier ¯ndings, we aggregate the training programmes in our data in a similar
way and consider the outcome total employment that includes both subsidised and unsubsidised
employment as in the study of Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006).
From panel (a) of Figure 8 we see that the inability of Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006) to
distinguish subsidised from unsubsidised employment is not responsible for their positive ¯ndings.
With the rede¯ned programme types and outcome we still do not ¯nd any positive e®ects on
(total) employment, and the lock-in e®ects are also considerably larger compared with the ones
obtained by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006) although programme durations are comparable
(or even shorter). Also in contrast to the ¯nding of larger lock-in e®ects, the participants in
the more recent training programmes have characteristics that make them likely to have more
disadvantageous a-priori employment prospects than participants in 1993-1994.13
Figure 8: E®ects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: total employment
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PF ST LT RT
PF sig. ST sig. LT sig. RT sig.
Note: Panel (a): all available covariates used. Panel (b): only covariates used that had also been available
in the data Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006) use. PF: practice ¯rm (387 observations). ST: short
training with planned duration · 6 months (includes all training measures; 3084 observations). LT:
long training with planned duration > 6 months (830 observations). RT: retraining (degree course;
415 observations). Abscissa: Months after programme start. Ordinate: E®ect in %-points. Each line
represents the respective population of participants, which di®ers for each programme. Dots indicate
that the e®ect is signi¯cant on the 5% level (sig.).
12 Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) and Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and VÄ olter (2007) obtain similar results but
use a methodology which is not comparable to ours and the one of Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006).
13 The more recent participants e.g. are lower skilled, older and have higher fractions of females and foreigners on
average.
28Another explanation for the more positive ¯ndings of Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006)
might be the unavailability of important control variables in their data, like health limitations,
disability status, compliance with bene¯t conditions, imposition of bene¯t sanctions, the char-
acteristics of the desired job and the number of placement propositions by the PES. To obtain
comparable estimates, we excluded these variables from the estimation of our selection models for
programme participation. However, panel (b) of Figure 8 shows that the results remain almost
unchanged, so that we can rule out inability to properly account for selectivity in programme
participation with respect to these variables as a reason for the earlier ¯ndings.
Lechner and Wunsch (2006b) show that the labour market conditions at programme start
also impact on the e®ectiveness of the programmes, especially on the lock-in e®ects. Control-
ling for changing composition of programmes and participants over time, they ¯nd a positive
relation between the unemployment rate at programme start and the employment e®ects of the
programmes. Indeed, labour market conditions were better in 2000-2001 than in 1993-1994. How-
ever, after September 2001 they deteriorated as well. Moreover, given the size of the correlation
Lechner and Wunsch (2006b) ¯nd and the fact that during both 1993-1994 and 2000-2002 the
unemployment rate varied (only) between 8-9% (Wunsch, 2006), this could, at best, only explain
a very small part of the large di®erences in the estimated e®ects.
To conclude, there remain several reasons for why the programme e®ects have changed. On the
one hand, the design and use of the programmes has changed quite a lot since the early nineties.
Moreover, it could be that the programme quality, or the quality of the selection process into the
programmes, or the availability of suitable potential participants declined. Finally, changes in
the characteristics of the labour market other than just the unemployment rate may have made
it more di±cult to reward programme participation.
295.5 Is there anything that could be improved?
Given our rather pessimistic assessment of the more recent West German labour market pro-
grammes, is there scope for improvement? From Section 5.3 we conclude that a better targeting
of the programmes to those groups of participants, for whom we ¯nd positive employment e®ects,
is likely to improve the overall e®ectiveness of the programmes. Moreover, inter-programme com-
parisons allow us to assess whether participants would have been better o® had they participated
in a di®erent programme.
Table 7 presents this comparisons for the persons in all participation states (given in lines)
compared with all alternatives (given in columns) based on the outcome variable measuring
unsubsidised employment at the end of the observation period. Whenever an e®ect is negative,
it means that, on average, the participants in that programme would have fared better in the
alternative programme. The numbers in brackets on the main diagonal of this table show the
level of the outcome variable for the persons in the respective treatment state.
Table 7: Inter-programme comparisons: unsubsidised employment
Treatment Comparison state
status NP EP SCM JSA ST GT6 GT6+ DC JRT
E®ect 2.5 years after programme start in %-points
NP [0.40] 0.06 0.01 0.05* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.11* 0.02
EP -0.09 [0.25] -0.12 -0.07 -0.13* -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 -0.04
SCM 0.03 -0.03 [0.37] 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.10* -0.03
JSA -0.01 0.00 -0.02 [0.33] -0.07* -0.04 -0.08* 0.03 -0.04
ST 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06 [0.40] 0.05 0.00 0.12* 0.01
GT6 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.02 [0.41] 0.02 0.16* 0.00
GT6+ -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.01 [0.41] 0.08 0.06
DC -0.15* -0.12 -0.12* -0.11* -0.19* -0.18* -0.07 [0.24] -0.06
JRT 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.08 [0.36]
Note: * (Italics) e®ect is signi¯cant on the 5% (10%) level. Entries in brackets on the
diagonal are the levels of the respective potential outcome in the respective
group of persons de¯ned by treatment status. O®-diagonal elements are the
e®ects of the treatment given in the line for its participants compared with
the state in the header of the column.
Ignoring nonparticipation, we ¯nd that participants in those programmes faring worst compared
to nonparticipation would have been better o® in some of the other programmes. Participants
in EP would have fared better in SCM, ST or GT6+. Those in DC would also have been better
30o® in SCM and ST as well as in JSA and GT6.14 However, participants in JSA would have
fared better in ST. Thus, there is scope for improvement in the allocation of unemployed to the
di®erent programmes.
Given our estimates of the mean potential outcomes in all states for each population of par-
ticipants and nonparticipants we are able to directly simulate the outcome of di®erent policies.
In Table 8 we present the mean employment rate in our sample 2.5 years after programme start
under di®erent assignment rules, as well as the corresponding approximate programme cost (ex-
cluding bene¯t payments). Ignoring potential general equilibrium e®ects and lacking exact cost
data as well as estimates of individual (conditional on characteristics) treatment response, this
provides a rough assessment of potential improvements in the allocation of participants.
Table 8: Outcome of di®erent assignment rules
Mean employment Approximate cost
Assignment rule rate in % in billion EUR p.a.
Actual allocation 38.7 2.0
Everyone in nonparticipation 38.9 -
Only persons without vocational education in ST 38.8 2.0
Only persons with time to treatment ¸ 5 months in GT6 38.9 2.0
Only persons with employment index below median in JRT 39.1 2.0
Only persons with employment index below median in programmes 40.0 2.0
Everyone in short training (ST) 41.3 1.6
Everyone where mean employment rate largest* 46.5 7.2
All participants where mean employment rate largest* 40.9 1.5
Note: Mean employment rates are calculated from the estimated mean potential outcomes 30 months after
programme start and the fraction of people in each state after imposing common support. Approx-
imate programme costs are the numbers from Table 4 multiplied by the numbers of participants in
the respective programme in our evaluation sample and scaled by the fraction of participants per year
that we cover with our sample (0.007). *Conditional on no-programme employment index below or
above median and treatment status.
We ¯nd that letting nobody participate would have generated the same mean employment rate
of 39% 2.5 years after programme start but would have saved the programme cost of roughly 2
billion EUR per year. This provides an interesting summary on our evidence on the (general lack
of) e®ectiveness of the more recent West German labour market programmes.
Yet, what happens if we send those groups of participants to those programmes for which we
¯nd some positive e®ects? When assigning only persons without a vocational education to ST,
14 Note, however, that participants in DC are still largely a®ected by the lock-in e®ects of this rather long pro-
gramme after 2.5 years.
31or only those with time to treatment ¸ 5 months to GT6, or only persons with disadvantageous
a-priori employment prospects to JRT, the mean employment rate is raised slightly, at no addi-
tional cost if the number of participants is kept unchanged. The combination of these rules is
likely to have a somewhat larger impact. Moreover, targeting programmes exclusively at persons
with disadvantageous a-priori employment prospects, for which the programmes e®ects overall
look most favourably, the mean employment rate would increase by more than 1% when total
participation rates are unchanged.
From Table 7 we see that ST seems to be the most attractive programme for most treatment
groups. So one possible assignment rule could be sending everyone to this inexpensive short pro-
gramme. Indeed, this would raise the mean employment rate by more than 2% and interestingly,
programme costs would even be reduced compared with the actual allocation because nobody is
sent to the expensive programmes.
Now, what if everyone is assigned to the state where employment rates are actually maximised?
Answering this question would require estimates of individual (conditional on characteristics)
treatment response for all states.15 Here, we only have estimates of the mean e®ects within
subgroups de¯ned by treatment status and potentially one additional characteristic. Thus, we
can explore this question only very roughly. Since the no-programme employment index we
constructed provides a nice summary of several important characteristics, we determine the state
for which the mean employment rate conditional on treatment status and the index being below
or above the sample median is largest. Reallocating all persons accordingly would raise the
men employment rate by almost 8%.16 However, the costs are immense because about half
of the nonparticipants would be sent to one of the rather expensive programmes. If we only
reallocate actual participants to the programmes with the largest expected return, then the
15 Estimating individual treatment response requires a di®erent methodology to estimate counterfactual outcomes.
See e.g. FrÄ olich, Lechner, and Steiger (2003), Lechner and Smith (2005), FrÄ olich (2007).
16 Assignment rule below median employment index: nonparticipants and participants in SCM and JSA to GT6+,
participants in EP, ST, GT6 and JRT to GT6, those in GT6+ to ST and those in DC to JRT. Above median
employment index: participants in EP and JRT to GT6, those in SCM, ST and DC to ST, those in GT6 to
SCM and those in JSA and GT6+ to nonparticipation.
32mean employment rate would only be raised by 2% but the programme costs would be reduced
considerably compared to the actual allocation.
In conclusion, there seems to be some scope for improvements in the mean employment rate.
Most interestingly, however, is the potential for cost savings of roughly 0.5 billion EUR per year
by a reallocation of participants and nonparticipants.
5.6 Sensitivity checks
We conducted several sensitivity analyses, the details of which are presented in the internet
appendix. Given the importance of the choice of the time window for de¯ning participants and
nonparticipants (see e.g. the arguments made by Fredriksson and Johansson, 2003, 2004; Sianesi,
2004), we checked the sensitivity of our results to this issue quite extensively. We repeated our
estimations using a 12, 24 and 36-month window instead of the 18-month window. The e®ects
increase slightly the longer the time window but overall conclusions do not change. We also
varied the criteria to de¯ne the common support. No signi¯cant changes appeared. For further
sensitivity checks of the matching estimator used see Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006).
6 Conclusion
We provide new evidence on the e®ectiveness of West German ALMP by evaluating training
and employment programmes that have been conducted 2000-2002, after the ¯rst large reform
of German labour market policy in 1998. We employ exceptionally rich administrative data
that allow us to use microeconometric matching methods to account for selectivity in programme
participation and to estimate interesting e®ects for di®erent types of programmes and participants
at a rather disaggregated level.
After the typical lock-in e®ects, we ¯nd that, on average, all programmes fail to improve
their participants' chances of ¯nding regular, unsubsidised employment within 2.5 years after
programme start. The longer training and employment programmes even make their participants
33worse o® compared to nonparticipation. Rather, participants accumulate 2-13 more months
of unemployment than nonparticipants over this period, partly because of additional programme
participations. This induces net costs in terms of bene¯t payments and wage subsidies amounting
to, on average, 1500-7000 EUR per participant without taking into account direct programme
costs. Based on a very rough measure of the latter, total net costs of programme participation
add up to 2000-20000 EUR per participant.
Since there are also no indications that positive employment e®ects can be expected for later
periods lying outside our observation window, the only e®ect of the programmes seems to be to
prevent participants from being passively unemployed by keeping them busy and requiring e®ort
in training programmes and subsidised employment, thus, also providing social contacts and daily
routines.
Comparing our rather pessimistic ¯ndings to previous estimates of Lechner, Miquel, and Wun-
sch (2006), who evaluate West German training programmes conducted 1993-1994 using similar
data and a similar methodology, we can rule out that di®erences in the aggregation of programme
types or the de¯nition of the outcome variable, or the unavailability of some control variables
are responsible for their more positive results. Thus, either the quality of the programmes, the
participants or the assignment process, or certain characteristics of the labour market, which
make programme participation less rewarding, have changed since the early 1990s.
Yet, there are some groups of participants for which certain types of programmes exhibit
positive e®ects on employment. Persons without any vocational education gain almost 10%-point
in terms of the probability to begin unsubsidised employment after about one year after starting
short training. Over the full 30-month period they gain about 2 months of employment. We also
¯nd positive employment e®ects for unemployed starting general further training with planned
duration up to 6 months not earlier than 5 months after entering unemployment. Moreover,
for participants with disadvantageous a-priori employment prospects job-related training turns
34out to be e®ective after about 20 months. Despite these positive ¯ndings, when looking at the
net e®ects over the 30-month observation period after programme start, it seems unlikely that
the programmes are cost-e®ective even for these groups of participants because net gains in
employment (or earnings) are either absent or only small.
So is there anything that could be improved? We use our estimates of the programme e®ects
within subgroups of participants as well as inter-programme comparisons to assess the optimality
of the allocation of jobseekers to the programmes. We ¯nd supporting evidence for the importance
of the assignment process for the overall e®ectiveness of ALMPs and show that there is some scope
for improvements in mean employment rates as well as potential for considerable cost savings by
a reallocation of participants and nonparticipants to di®erent programmes.
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